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The UEFA Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (hereinafter –UEFA 
Regulations) 2 provide a licensing system for clubs for admission to competitions 
such as the Champions League and the Europa League. These requirements are 
aimed at promoting fair play, which does not consider the difference in the 
property capabilities of clubs in the UEFA competitions. The requirements have 
a goal to improve the economic and financial situation of clubs, increase their 
transparency, reliability of funding sources and fulfill their debt obligations 
within the prescribed time limit. One of the requirements is that the clubs are not 
allowed to delay payments to other clubs and (or) their players, to delay tax or 
other mandatory payments. The decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(hereinafter – CAS) on disputes about the violation of licensing requirements and 
financial fair play3 provide a new look at the discussion about the fairness of 
financial fair play. The objectives of the Regulation of fair play are aimed at 
creating the conditions for the financial stability of football clubs and the integrity 
of the UEFA competitions. In turn, compliance with regulatory objectives may:  
(1) Predetermine the non-legal nature of certain provisions of the UEFA 
Regulations or the UEFA Regulations as a whole. 
(2) Violate the principles of equal treatment in bringing to responsibility and 
(or) proportionality of the disciplinary sanctions applied.  
(2) In this study, due to its limited scope, we will consider in detail only the second 
content of compliance with the objectives of the Regulation of the UEFA fair play 
by referring to CAS analysis of the principles of equal treatment in bringing to 
responsibility and (or) proportionality of disciplinary sanctions. 
 
Keywords: financial fair play, objectives of financial fair play, equity of 
responsibility, proportionality, disciplinary responsibility, practice of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport. 
                                                 
1 This research was funded by RFBR according to the research project N 19-011-00528 «The concept of justice in 
the modern Russian legal system». 
2UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. − 
URL:   https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/56/20/15/2562015_D
OWNLOAD.pdf. 
3 CAS 2016/A/4492 Galatasaray vs. UEFA; CAS 2018/A/5808 AC Milan v. UEFA. 
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1. Main text 
1.1. Applying the principle of equal treatment when clubs are held accountable for 
violation of licensing requirements and financial fair play. 
According to the club, in the CAS 2012/A/2824 dispute4, comparing this case with the 
“PAOK” case5, it is possible to reveal much in common, but the results differ significantly 
from each other. This is a demonstration of the double standards applied by UEFA and it is a 
clear example of the abuse of UEFA’s position. UEFA gave that club a second chance – if it 
committed a repeated violation, only then the sanction would be applied. The club offered a 
concrete action plan and therefore it needs to be given a second chance, as the “PAOK” 
football club was given. 
The question of equal treatment in the application of the practice of the UEFA and CAS 
jurisdictional bodies is a comparison of the factual circumstances of the two disputes, with the 
establishment of which it is possible to speak of a violation of this principle. In the PAOK 
case, the club faced financial difficulties but did not try to disguise the arrears: it acted 
openly and presented a reorganization plan. Therefore, the UEFA jurisdictional body 
decided that suspension from participation in competitions could be a conditional sanction. In 
addition, the club “PAOK” did not have arrears on March 31, when it was granted a license. 
The only club’s violation was the presence of outstanding debt for June and September 2011, 
which was revealed in the process of observation.  
In view of the above, the situations in the “PAOK” case and club’s case are different. 
Thus, it is impossible to appeal to unequal treatment in the process of bringing the club 
to responsibility in CAS 2012/A/2824.This conclusion can be extended by the position of 
arbitration in the CAS 2013/A/3233 dispute6, according to which the admission of the club to 
participate in the UEFA competitions, provided that it has a license issued on the basis of false 
information, is just a violation of the principle of equal treatment. 
1.2. Applying the principle of proportionality in bringing clubs to responsibility for 
violation of licensing requirements and financial fair play. 
In the CAS 2012/A/2824 dispute, the violation of the principle of proportionality was 
motivated by the club due to the fact that the new management, having “inherited” financial 
problems, coped with them properly and had already made a large number of payments to 
clubs and players. The undoubted proof of success, according to the club, is that the plaintiff 
is now fulfilling the current financial plan, and it strictly corresponds to the main goal – to 
reduce the debt of the club. Such positive results should be taken into account by the UEFA 
jurisdictional body, which should have made a proportionate and fair decision. Citing the 
example of practice, the club turned to the case of “Olympiacos Volou”7, in which the 
prosecuted club had committed one of the most serious offenses in sports, namely, it was 
involved in a contractual match. Comparing the two disputes, it is difficult to understand why 
both clubs got the same sanction – deprivation of the right to participate in the UEFA 
competitions, which has a conditional nature. 
                                                 
4 Arbitration CAS 2012/A/2824 Besiktas JK v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), award 
of 31 October 2012. 
5 CAS 2012/A/2824, paras. 48, 49. 
6 Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3233 PAE Giannina 1966 v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), 
award of 9 December 2013 (operative part of 16 July 2013). 
7 CAS 2013/A/3233, para. 83. 
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The objectives of the UEFA Regulations are to ensure the normal financial situation of 
clubs and the ability to act as a “reliable member of the football family”. UEFA should provide 
support to those clubs that do something right, but differently than their predecessors. In CAS 
2012/A/2824, the club followed a systematic policy of waiting for decisions from FIFA or 
CAS before making payment under the transfer contract, paying fees, compensation for 
training players or making payments under the solidarity mechanism. In other words, the club 
remained indebted to other clubs, waiting for them to act, and never paid until a final decision 
was made. This allowed the club to unreasonably delay payment deadlines, while it was unable 
to pay on time. As a result, the club gained an unjustified advantage and, in addition, it 
jeopardized the financial well-being of its creditor clubs. It should be considered that the club 
benefited from the games of the Europa League, without disclosing the correct and truthful 
information about the debt that it had. There is no doubt that all of the above is a violation of 
the principles of financial fair play. 
The club argued that the sanction was disproportionate, comparing it to the “Olympiacos 
Volou” case, but the two disputes were different: the “Olympiacos Volou” case was related to 
contractual matches, and the club was expelled from the Europa League and, in addition, 
“Olympiacos Volou” was conditionally deprived of the right to participate in subsequent 
competitions under the aegis of UEFA for 3 years with a trial period of 5 years.  
In total, according to UEFA, this justifies a severe sanction in the form of a fine and 
exclusion from the competition without a trial period. The sanction applied in the appealed 
decision is quite reasonable for the club which had debts both on March 31, June 30 and 
September 30 and which intentionally misled, representing them as “disputable”. The 
decision is not disproportionate only because an alternative decision could have been taken. 
As we know, according to CAS practice the decision must be obvious and extremely 
disproportionate, which is not the case here8. 
CAS agreed with the position of UEFA – only that another sanction can be applied in 
the case does not make the sanction disproportionate. The club had to prove that the decision 
made by the UEFA jurisdictional body was obviously and extremely disproportionate. CAS 
also noted that the plaintiff had a systematic approach to take debt obligations to other clubs 
and ignore them until it was forced to pay FIFA or CAS: the club borrow from other clubs 
and thus created unequal conditions. At the same time, the club could not prove that the 
payments were not made in good faith, allegedly “following the principle of waiting for the 
final decision in order to achieve a correct calculation”9. If so, the club should have submitted 
the decisions of the competent authorities with his position and calculation parameters. Since 
the club ignored these demands of other clubs and did not challenge them, it acted in bad 
faith.  
In CAS 2013/A/345310, Panel properly explained the meaning of the double penalty, 
which consists of a fine and a potential exclusion from the upcoming competition. These 
measures are appropriate for punishing clubs that do not comply with the UEFA Regulations: 
the imposition of one fine, which would be sufficient to prevent further violations, would 
inevitably mean its large size and would have an adverse impact on the financial position 
                                                 
8 CAS 2012/A/2824, para. 54. 
9 CAS 2012/A/2824, paras. 127-129. 
10 Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3453 FC Petrolul Ploiesti v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), 
award of 20 February 2014 (operative part of 28 January 2014). 
Faculty of Law, Goce Delcev University, Shtip,  
Republic of N. Macedonia 
276 
of the club, which would violate one of the main objectives of the Regulations.  On the other 
hand, if the exclusion of a club, which has violated the UEFA Regulations, from the 
competition, is a conditional sanction before the payment of account payables by a certain 
date, the imposition of a fine is necessary to keep the clubs from abuse in the form of 
regular postponement of payment until a fixed date. 
In the CAS 2013/A/3233 dispute11, the club considered that the UEFA jurisdictional 
body could confine itself to a fine or revoke the right to participate in competitions 
conditionally: such measures would be more consistent with the principle of proportionality, 
according to which the sanction must be necessary and appropriate to the violation. It should 
be considered that the validity of the license issued in accordance with the UEFA Regulations 
is a necessary condition for admission to the competition. Accordingly, if this requirement is 
not met and the license is issued on the basis of false information, the only possible decision 
that can be taken is to deny the club the right to participate in the UEFA competitions. 
Based on such considerations, CAS believes that there is no room in such disputes to test 
the proportionality of the sanction applied. 
It should be emphasized that settlement agreements, that under the Regulations can be 
proposed by UEFA, are not equivalent to sanctions and therefore their application is not a 
priori proportionate in comparison with disciplinary sanctions12, but the legal nature of the 
UEFA Regulations’ rules is expressed in the right to choose between settlement agreements 
and disciplinary sanctions13. 
1.3. Application of national legislation to define "arrears" used in the UEFA 
Regulations. 
In CAS 2013/A/306714 club believed that despite the application of the UEFA 
Regulations, the question of arrears should be resolved taking into account the tax legislation 
of the state. These rules are relevant not only to resolve the issue of whether or not the 
club's debts existed but also whether they were overdue on the reporting dates specified 
in the UEFA Regulations. 
The club's request for a deferral within the “voluntary payment term” under national 
law could obviously be accepted or rejected by the tax authorities. According to the club, in 
the first case (when accepting the request), the tax authorities would publish a schedule of debt 
repayment (in installments, payments for which were to be made on certain dates) of the 
remaining amount. Payments carried out in accordance with this calendar, then came to be 
considered produced in the framework of the “voluntary term of payment”, therefore, these 
payments cannot be considered overdue. In the second case (if the request had been 
rejected), the tax authorities would have set a deadline for payment, which should have been 
considered the final date of the voluntary deadline for payment. 
Consequently, as long as the final date set by the tax authority has not come, the debt 
cannot be considered overdue. It follows that regardless of tax authorities’ decision on the 
request for granting a delay within the “voluntary payment deadline” and as long as the 
                                                 
11 CAS 2013/A/3453, para. 84. 
12 Arbitration CAS 2018/A/5808 AC Milan v. UEFA, para. 142. 
13 CAS 2018/A/5808, para. 140. 
14 Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3067 Málaga CF SAD v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), 
award of 8 October 2013 (operative part of 11 June 2013). 
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taxpayer observes the instructions of the tax authorities, the debt cannot be considered 
overdue. 
When considering the CAS 2013/A/3067 dispute, it is necessary to take into account 
the provisions of article 63.3 of the UEFA Statutes15  and article R58 of the CAS Code16 , 
according to which the law applicable to the dispute is the provisions of the Regulations and 
acts of the sports organization that made the appealed decision, that is, UEFA in our case. 
Swiss law is applied in a subsidiary manner, following article R58 of the CAS Code. As noted 
by the arbitration in CAS 2013/A/3067, if it was necessary to take a different view, according 
to which the application and interpretation of the Regulations would depend on the relevant 
national laws of each of the clubs participating in the UEFA competitions, the objectives of 
the Regulations would be jeopardized. The purpose of the Regulations is to establish equal 
conditions for clubs and to ensure equal treatment of all participants in the UEFA 
competitions. In order to ensure that the club's debts to the tax authorities can be considered 
overdue or not, CAS should rely solely on the Regulations and, depending on circumstances, 
on Swiss law. On the contrary, Spanish legislation should not be considered. 
CAS notes that a different set of rules will be used with respect to applicable law issues. 
This will be fairer if the goal is to create favorable conditions for participation in international 
competitions of football clubs. The idea has the same possibilities – regardless of the fact that 
the club is in full compliance with the principle of freedom of association. This also follows 
from the practice of CAS, according to which the rules cannot be overcome in accordance 
with the law since this leads to a violation of the principle of equality in relation to 
different countries17. 
In this regard, CAS believes that - in contrast to the appellant's opinion - the national 
legislation does not apply without taking into account the definition of “overdue debt” by 
UEFA. At first glance, it may seem that such a definition is only suitable for contractual 
obligations since only with respect to the latter conditions can be established. However, if we 
take into account Annex VIII to the UEFA Regulations as a whole, it becomes obvious that 
this provision applies not only to contractual obligations but to all types of obligations 
established by these Regulations. Thus, the term arrears is defined and should be considered 
autonomously, regardless of national legislation. 
1.4. The tacit consent of public authorities to the club’s application for a grace period 
for mandatory payments. 
As the arbitration in CAS 2013/A/3067 emphasized, all the necessary conditions 
stipulated in Annex VIII to the UEFA Regulations would be fully complied with by the club 
if it made a request for a postponement and received written consent from the tax authorities. 
However, the absence of any feedback from the Spanish tax authorities and a clear 
decision to postpone the deadline for payment cannot be considered compliance with the 
above requirement. In making this conclusion, CAS did not ignore the fact that some national 
laws recognize the concept of tacit consent in the affairs of individuals who can submit a 
                                                 
15UEFA Statutes. . − URL: 
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/General/02/56/20/45/2562045_DOWNLOAD.
pdf. 
16Code of Sports-related Arbitration. − URL: https://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code_2019__en_.pdf. 
17 CAS 2013/A/3067, para. 9.4. 
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request to public authorities, and the latter will not be active. However, even if it is assumed 
that in this case, the Spanish tax authorities gave tacit consent regarding the postponement of 
the deadlines for payments, this is not sufficient, since the UEFA Regulation explicitly 
requires that the consent be given in writing. 
The club believes that it is enough that the request was sooner or later satisfied since the 
taxpayer does not have the right to force the tax authorities to decide within certain deadlines, 
it can only wait for a decision. According to the club, it would be unwise to impose sanctions 
for the delay resulting from the excessive workload of the tax authorities, and it cannot be 
punished for the fact that the Spanish tax authorities could not decide on his request in a shorter 
time, that is, within the appropriate time limits in accordance with the UEFA Regulations. 
Moreover, the club argues that the concept of force majeure, enshrined in Annex XI to the 
Rules of Procedure, will not be respected unless the fact that the appellant had no 
opportunity to induce the tax authorities to make a decision will not be taken into 
account. 
CAS did not accept the club’s arguments. It is worth noting that the situation in the case 
in question is no different from when the club asks the private lender (the club, for 
example) to postpone the deadline for payment: in this case, the debtor also does not have 
any authority capable of forcing the lender to decide on his request, but this is not a case of 
force majeure. Moreover, arbitration takes into account the fact that, contrary to the appellant’s 
statements, the debtor had a definite influence on the timely decision-making on his request. 
This effect was that it could have submitted a request to postpone the payment deadline 
earlier: the earlier the request was submitted, the earlier a decision could be made to postpone 
it. CAS believes that the request was made almost at the very last moment before the reporting 
date and that the answer was not received in due time, it is not only the tax authorities that 
should be blamed. 
1.5. Observance of terms by the club for the conclusion in writing delays on payments.  
In CAS 2013/A/323318 dispute the arbitration noted: the fact that as of March 31, 2013, 
the applicant owed tax authorities according to the contractual obligations which arose till 
December 31, 2012. As is known, in accordance with Annex VII to the Regulations, the debt 
is not considered overdue, within the meaning of these rules, if the debtor club can prove until 
March 31 that it has entered into a deferment agreement, which was accepted in writing with 
the creditor. In this case, on March 31, 2013, there was no written agreement confirming that 
the national tax authorities agreed to extend the payment period beyond the deadline. Indeed, 
on January 3, 2013, and on March 26, 2013, the club filed an application with the tax 
authorities to resolve their financial problems. However, in the light of the UEFA Regulations, 
it is not enough to take action to obtain a deferment - an agreement with the competent 
tax authority must be concluded in writing within an acceptable time frame. It is not 
disputed that the club has concluded a written agreement with the tax authorities to transfer 
and pay overdue payables. However, such an agreement was concluded on May 29, 2013, that 
is, almost two months after the expiration of the permissible period. 
As noticed arbitration in CAS 2013/A/3233, clubs have to not only fulfill the material 
requirements established in acts and regulations of the sports organizations, but they have to 
                                                 
18 Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3233 PAE Giannina 1966 v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), 
award of 9 December 2013 (operative part of 16 July 2013). 
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satisfy these conditions in certain dates: the good organization of any competition requires 
the use of accurate terms. In one of the arbitration awards (CAS 2008/A/157919), it was noted 
that the question of deadlines has to be considered according to the principle of equality, it has 
to belong to all clubs and national football associations. Besides, the purpose of the term 
established by the Regulations of UEFA is also equitable to the interests of legal definiteness 
taking into account that the first selection round of the UEFA Europa League is usually carried 
out at the beginning of July. 
1.6. The force majeure circumstances interfering implementation of payments by clubs 
inappropriate terms. 
In the CAS 2014/A/353320 dispute, the arbitration indicated that the wording, language, 
and meaning of the appealed decision is incontrovertible and clear and require the club to 
prove that it fully paid the outstanding overdue payables by January 31, 2014. Compliance 
with this requirement was the only way to prevent the application of the sanction, but the club 
did not fulfill this condition. In this regard, the club claimed that due to financial problems, 
as well as due to the difficult social and political situation in the country, it could not fully 
repay its debt to foreign clubs by January 31, 2014. 
The position of UEFA was that the club’s reference to the social and political situation 
in the state was irrelevant to the case under consideration: although it is possible that this 
situation made it difficult for the club to pay foreign clubs but the club managed to transfer 
a certain amount to creditors in January 2014. Therefore, it can be argued that the real reason 
for not making payments is that the club did not have money, and the circumstances stated by 
the club are not force majeure. 
Turning to the practice of CAS, it can be noted that the club’s financial problems or lack 
of funds are consistently denied as the legal basis for default (CAS 2005/A /95721; CAS 
2006/A/111022). Arbitration adheres to the definition of force majeure, which was previously 
given in decision CAS 2002/A/38823: force majeure, in fact, implies an objective, rather than 
a personal, obstacle that does not depend on the “obliged party”, that is, it is impossible to 
resist and in connection with the occurrence of which the performance of the obligation 
becomes impossible. In addition, the conditions for the occurrence of force majeure should 
be interpreted narrowly, since force majeure is an exception to the principle of binding 
force of obligation. 
In light of this definition, CAS believes that the situation referred to by the club cannot 
be considered as a case of force majeure: although arbitration understands the economic 
situation in the club’s country, nevertheless, it believes that the conditions for the occurrence 
of force of insuperable circumstances are not satisfied since the situation in the state did not 
prevent the club from paying a certain amount to creditors in January 2014. The club claimed 
                                                 
19 Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1579 Fudbalski Klub Zemun v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football 
(UEFA), award of 26 November 2008. 
20 Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3533 Football Club Metallurg v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football 
(UEFA), award of 9 September 2014. 
 
21 Arbitration CAS 2005/A/957 Clube Atlético Mineiro v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA), award of 23 March 2006, para. 56. 
22 Arbitration CAS 2006/A/1110 PAOK FC v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), award of 
25 August 2006 (operative part of 13 July 2006), para. 43. 
23 Arbitration CAS 2002/A/388, Ülker Sport /Euroleague, award of 10 September 2002, p. 4. 
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that these payments were emergency payments made through an offshore company, as it was 
technically impossible to make payments in foreign currency from its state to clubs located 
outside. However, CAS considered that through these extraordinary payments, the club 
complied with the terms of the deferral agreement it entered into with its creditors, thereby 
showing that the debtor was not objectively deprived of the opportunity to fulfill its 
payment obligations due to the circumstances that it was declared as a force majeure. 
In addition, the alleged difficulties with bank transfers to clubs outside the state were 
not supported by concrete evidence. In order to fulfill the burden of proof, the appellant had 
to provide evidence in these proceedings regarding why the entire amount of the debt 
could not be paid through an offshore company. It would be appropriate here to refer to 
decision CAS 2008/A/162124, in which the arbitration formulated the position that  the club 
should have declared a general adversity in a particular place, that simply referring to a 
common problematic situation in a particular place is not enough to justify a violation on the 
basis of use of certain circumstances as force majeure. The party that submits the application 
must identify and prove which concrete and precise fact prevented it from carrying out certain 
activities. Therefore, CAS reasonably in CAS 2014/A/3533 took the position that, apparently, 
the club could pay the full amount to its creditors by means of payments through an offshore 
company by January 31, 2014, if sufficient funds were available. However, as mentioned by 
the club in the appeal statement “... investors of the club did not include such items of 
expenditure in the budget of the club”25. Consequently, the club’s refusal to fulfill its 
obligations in a timely manner was caused by the reasons falling under its responsibility. 
2. Conclusions. 
The club licensing system, which is based on monitoring the financial situation of the 
club, requires that clubs are on an equal position, reflecting a fair balance of European 
competitions under the auspices of UEFA. Thus, one club should not receive an unfair 
advantage by evading the obligations arising from the UEFA Regulations, especially 
referring to national legislation or resorting to fictitious force majeure circumstances. 
Not surprisingly, the CAS formulated the rule that reference to national legislation in the 
context of the UEFA Regulation is possible only when it is necessary for the application of the 
Regulation and when reference to national legislation does not undermine the objectives of the 
Regulation. After analyzing the presented CAS practice, it can be concluded that the UEFA 
Regulations do not demonstrate non-legal criteria, differing in the fair purpose of Regulation: 
restricts clubs, whose financial capabilities allow them to operate not in the economic model, 
spending much more than they earn, and have an advantage over clubs with the balance of 
income and expenses26. 
Promoting the interests of football as a sport through compliance with licensing 
requirements and financial fair play is a goal that should be taken into account when 
interpreting the provisions contained in the UEFA Regulations. The provisions of the UEFA 
Regulations are aimed at preventing disputes about the content of the concepts used in 
it, introducing a uniform definition, for example, of one of the key issues – what constitutes 
“overdue debt”. The UEFA Regulations allow the terms to be unambiguously defined and, 
                                                 
24 Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1621 Iraqi Football Association v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) & Qatar Football Association, award of 29 September 2008, para. 62. 
25 CAS 2014/A/3533, para. 63. 
26 CAS 2016/A/4492 Galatasaray vs. UEFA, para. 77. 
6th INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE: SOCIAL CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL 
WORLD, Shtip, September 05-06 2019 
281 
as a result, there are no grounds for applying the principle of “contra proferentem”, 
according to which, with some ambiguity of a particular provision of the contract, it is 
interpreted against the party that drafted the contract. 
Turning to the practice of CAS for the category of cases we are interested in, you can 
see that if the clubs in the monitoring process had large amounts of overdue debts or several 
debts (or both), they were cumulatively applied to such sanctions as deprivation of the right to 
participate in competitions and fine. The number and (or) amount of overdue debts were taken 
into account. For example, in the CAS 2012/A/2824 dispute, the arbitration had no doubts that 
several debts, along with the fact that the national football association should not have issued 
the license, motivated the sanctions we mentioned earlier. CAS noted that the sanction 
applied to the club is evidence of how seriously (on the same level as the manipulation of 
the results of competitions, matches) UEFA treats violations of licensing requirements and 
financial fair play. 
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